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Abstract This paper defends and develops the capacity view against insightful
critiques from Matt McGrath, Adam Pautz, and Ram Neta. In response to Matt
McGrath, I show why capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with
representational content. I argue moreover, that the asymmetry between the
employment of perceptual capacities in the good and the bad case is sufficient to
account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by the employment of
such capacities. In response to Adam Pautz, I show why a perceiver’s belief is better
justified than the belief of someone who suffers a subjectively indistinguishable
hallucination. I show, moreover, why the capacity view is compatible with standard
Bayesian principles and how it accounts for degrees of justification. In response to
Ram Neta, I discuss the relationship between evidence and rational confidence, as
well as the notion of evidence in light of an externalism about perceptual content.
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1 Introduction
In ‘‘Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence’’ I argue that perceptual experience
provides us with phenomenal evidence and in the good case with additional factive
evidence. Matt McGrath, Adam Pautz, and Ram Neta have each responded with
insightful critiques of my argument. I am grateful to them for continuing the
discussion in such a thoughtful way. In what follows, I will briefly state my view,
and will then respond to each of their comments in turn.
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I argue that it is because an experiencing subject is employing perceptual
capacities with a certain nature that her perceptual states have epistemic force. The
notion of a capacity is understood to be explanatorily basic. Among capacity views
there is a distinction to be drawn between normative capacity views, on which
mental capacities are understood as virtues or in other normative ways, and capacity
views that forego normative terms.1 I aim to defend a version of the capacity view
that is distinctly non-normative and non-reliabilist. On the proposed view,
employing perceptual capacities yields a mental state with a certain representational
content. A perceptual experience can be individuated with regard to the content type
that is determined by the capacities employed in perceptual experience. Alterna-
tively, each perceptual experience can be individuated with regard to the
environment-dependent token content that ensues from employing perceptual
capacities in a particular environment. Insofar as the perceptual capacities employed
are the very same in subjectively indistinguishable experiences, the content type
will be the same. So there is a metaphysically substantive common element between
the good and the bad case. So the capacity view is non-disjunctivist, yet externalist.
Individuating experiences by a content type amounts to individuating experiences
with regard to the experiencing subject’s sensory state. Phenomenal evidence is
determined by the content type of a perceptual experience. Factive evidence is
determined by the environment-dependent token content of a perceptual experience.
So the factive evidential basis changes as the token content changes—even if one
cannot tell. In this sense, factive evidence provides the perceiver with evidence that
goes beyond mere phenomenal evidence. So the distinction between phenomenal
and factive evidence emerges from two levels of perceptual content.
When I speak of mental states as yielded by employing perceptual capacities, I
mean to be saying that the person can—as currently constituted, and not merely via
some sort of intensive training regimen—successfully make certain characteristic-
of-that-mental-state discriminations in certain sorts of cases (good cases). For
instance, take the fact that Sara is in the mental state of perceiving red. I am
identifying this fact with Sara’s ability (as she is currently constituted) to
successfully discriminate red from green and other colors. So capacity talk boils
down to how the person as currently constituted would fare in the good case. When I
say that I understand mental states in terms of capacities, I mean the general thesis
that all facts about a subject being in a given mental state should be understood in
terms of the person having the capacity to make characteristic-of-that-mental-state
discriminations in the good case. For current purposes, a more restricted thesis will
do: when considering epistemically relevant mental states in the context of
epistemic evaluation, such mental states are to be understood in such contexts in
terms of capacities to succeed in the good case.
1 For the former, see Sosa (1991), Greco (2001) and Bergmann (2006). For capacity views that forgo
normative terms, see Burge (2003), Graham (2011) and Schellenberg (2013a, 2014a).
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2 Reply to McGrath
I am grateful to McGrath for his thoughtful, challenging, and detailed comments.
McGrath elegantly articulates a competitor view supported by three powerful
arguments. He suggests moving from the capacity-first account of perceptual
evidence (as I provide) to a mental-state-first account (as he prefers). He raises three
converging objections to my view: (1) content properties are fundamentally
epistemically relevant and capacities are not, (2) my account does not generate the
intuitive verdicts about the bad case (though I claim otherwise), and (3) my account
does not handle singular but nondemonstrative perceptual beliefs. I will consider
these in turn.
2.1 Contents versus capacities
By sketching a view that is very much like mine in terms of working with content
tokens and content types, and having two notions of evidence—factive evidence and
phenomenal evidence—keyed to these contents, McGrath sharply puts into focus
the key elements of the capacity view. The only difference between the capacity
view and the alternative view that McGrath sketches is that, while the former
explains the epistemic force of perceptual content in terms of the perceptual
capacities that yield these contents, the latter does not. The alternative view simply
imbues these contents with epistemic force directly. This enables McGrath to
crisply pose the question of why we need to take the extra step of moving from
contents to capacities.
In response, I offer two connected reasons why we cannot stop at the level of the
contents themselves and need to bring in perceptual capacities. First, content
itself—without mention of what sort of propositional attitude is involved—cannot
provide epistemic force in itself. The fact that I am in some way bearing some
attitude to the content that the cat is on the mat leaves open whether my attitude is
one of belief, doubt, hope, or fear. No one thinks that hopes or fears have epistemic
force.
Now in fairness, McGrath does not simply appeal to content but includes that it is
an experience. For instance, he says:
Why does your experience as of a white cup justify you in believing of the cup
that it is white? The first-stab answer is: because it is an experience having the
singular content concerning that cup that it is white. The question is why this
first stab wouldn’t be the end of the epistemic story, as far as facts about the
experience are concerned (McGrath 2015).
So really, McGrath’s alternative view does not stop at the level of content, but rather
at the level of experiences with content. And this is apt: McGrath thereby blocks
hopes and fears from having epistemic force, despite the fact that they have content
too.
But secondly, McGrath does nothing to explain why experiences-with-content
have any more epistemic force than hopes-with-content or fears-with-content. He
Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence defended: replies… 931
123
does not address the question of what is so epistemically forceful about experience.
As I see it, this is the core question. And so McGrath’s first stab answer cannot be
the end of the epistemic story, insofar as the epistemic story should (inter alia) offer
a satisfying answer to what is epistemically special about experience.
Here is where capacities come in. I argue that experiences have epistemic force
in virtue of the perceptual capacities employed that function to single out particulars
in the environment. It is because the capacities involve function differently in
experience than they do in hoping and in fearing, that experiences-with-content can
have more epistemic force than hopes-with-content or fears-with-content. Percep-
tion is our primordial connection to particulars in our environment. The crucial
difference between perception, on the one hand, and beliefs, hopes, fears, and
imaginations on the other, is that perceptual capacities function to single out the
particulars to which we are perceptually related, while the capacities employed in
those other mental states do not necessarily have this function. This is why we need
to take the extra step of moving from contents to capacities.
I suppose McGrath could say that it is just a basic fact about evidence that
experience has a distinctive connection to evidence. His analogy with the role of
suffering in value theory seems to suggest this line: Just as suffering might be a
primitive notion from the perspective of value theory, so experience might be a
primitive notion from the perspective of epistemology. Of course it is hard to argue
against a primitivist view, save to say that primitivism should generally be a
theoretical last resort, to be accepted only when all satisfying explanations fail. I
have tried to provide a satisfying explanation in terms of capacities.
In short, both the notion of content and the notion of experience that McGrath
appeals to need explaining. Neither notion is well suited to be explanatory basic. I
explain the notion of content as well as the notion of sensory perceptual states in a
unified way in terms of employing perceptual capacities, arguing that there is an
explanatory and metaphysical primacy of the good case over the bad case given that
capacities function to do what they do in the good case.
Now McGrath thinks I need more than this and offers two ways I might
supplement the capacity view: (1) by appealing to a reliabilist account of capacities
or (2) by appealing to the reliability of conditions explanatory of one’s having the
capacity. As McGrath notes, I do not in any way appeal to a reliabilist account, be it
of the first or the second, broadly Burgean, variety. I do not need to. Here is an
attempt to explain why. I argue that sensory states are systematically linked to
particulars of the type that the sensory state is of in the good case in the sense that
the perceptual capacities employed in the bad case are explanatorily and
metaphysically parasitic on their employment in the good case. There is an
explanatory primacy of the good over the bad case since one can give an analysis of
the perceptual capacities employed in the bad case only by appealing to their role in
the good case. This explanatory primacy is licenced by a metaphysical primacy of
the good over the bad case: There is such a metaphysical primacy insofar as
perceptual capacities are determined by relations between perceivers and their
environment insofar as the function of the capacity is to differentiate and single out,
say, instances of red in perception.
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On one way of understanding metaphysical primacy, we can associate things
with natures and see if the nature of one thing makes reference to another. If so, the
latter will be said to be primary and the former secondary. We can then construct
chains so that if the nature of A makes reference to B, and the nature of B makes
reference to C, then C will be primary, B secondary, and A tertiary. According to the
capacity view, the bad case is by nature a case brought about by the subject
employing her perceptual capacities, and these capacities are by nature defined in
terms of success in the good case. So on this pattern, we get the good case coming
out primary and the bad case coming our secondary. This is not the only way to use
talk of metaphysical primacy but it is one plausible way of using the term.
In speaking of it being the function of perceptual capacities to single out the
relevant particulars, I do not mean to speak of their reliability but rather of how they
are to be understood metaphysically. It is the function of a perceptual capacity to
single out, say, instances of red. This is so regardless of how often the capacity is
employed successfully to single out an instance of red. More generally, if a subject’s
environment sensorily seems to contain F particulars, then she is in a sensory state
that is determined by employing perceptual capacities that function to single out
F particulars. Now, given that perceptual capacities can be employed while failing
to single out F particulars, one might ask why they function to single out particulars
rather than fail to do so. What explains the asymmetry? In response, any plausible
account of natural function will support the idea that the heart has the function to
pump blood rather than the function to fail to pump blood. This is so even though
hearts may fail to pump blood. Likewise, perceptual capacities have the function to
single out particulars in the environment rather than to fail to do so. This is even
though they may fail to single out a particular. An evolutionary account of function
would posit that perceptual capacities evolved for the purpose of singling out
particulars rather than for the purpose of failing to single out particulars: they were
selected to single out particulars. However, there is no need to explain the
asymmetry in evolutionary terms or in any other reliabilist terms. On any plausible
account of natural function, we can say that perceptual capacities function to single
out particulars rather than fail to do so. In this sense, the idea of a natural function is
not tied into the idea of these functions being reliable or the conditions explanatory
of a system having that capacity being reliable.
If this is right, then the epistemic force of perceptual experience neither relies on
perceptual capacities being reliable nor on the reliability of conditions explanatory
of one’s having the capacity. On the suggested capacity view, if a subject is in a
sensory state that is determined by employing perceptual capacities that function to
single out F particulars, then she is in a sensory state that provides evidence for the
presence of F particulars. It is rational to heed the testimony of our senses since
sensory states are systematically linked to the particulars that they are of in the good
case. The notion of systematic linkage in play is understood in terms of a
metaphysical and explanatory primacy notion rather than a reliabilist notion. Now,
the perceptual capacities employed in perception may happen to be reliable.
However, even in this case it is the primacy of the good over the bad case that gives
experience its epistemic force.
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As McGrath notes, part of what is at issue in whether or not one invokes
reliability is what one can say about Swampman cases, in which an atom-by-atom
duplicate of a human being forms spontaneously when lightning strikes a swamp.
Intuitively one wants to say that Swampman’s experience can provide him
evidence. I can say this, provided it is agreed that Swampman’s perceptual
capacities function to single out particulars just as ours do. So, I can give the
intuitive response that Swampman has evidence even though he has no past
interactions with anything and lacks ancestors.
2.2 Hallucination and singular beliefs?
McGrath worries that my ‘‘treatment of Percy and Hallie underestimates the
epistemological credentials of Hallie’s beliefs.’’ Consider Percy who perceives a
white cup and Hallie who suffers a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination as of
a white cup. Hallie does not know she is hallucinating. As far as she can tell, she is
perceiving. On the basis of their experiences, Percy and Hallie both form a belief
that can be expressed with the utterance ‘‘that is a white cup’’. I argue that Percy has
more evidence than Hallie for his belief: Percy has factive evidence in addition to
phenomenal evidence. Hallie has only phenomenal evidence.
McGrath imagines Hallie declaring ‘‘that is a white cup’’ and thereby expressing
a justified singular belief. But, McGrath continues, ‘‘for Schellenberg Hallie’s
singular belief isn’t justified, because there is no evidence for it, no factive and no
phenomenal evidence.’’ McGrath argues that Hallie has no factive evidence since
she is hallucinating, and no phenomenal evidence for the singular proposition since
phenomenal evidence is only for general propositions.
First, there is a terminological issue of whether we call Hallie’s belief a singular
belief. McGrath uses ‘‘singular belief’’ in such a way that singular beliefs need not
have singular contents. So the way he uses the term, Hallie’s claim ‘‘that cup is
white’’ expresses a singular belief even though it has a gappy content. By contrast, I
am using ‘‘singular belief’’ in such a way that singular beliefs always have singular
content. So the way I am using the term, Hallie does not have a singular belief. So
while Hallie might say, ‘‘that cup is white’’, the content of that belief is not a
singular proposition, even though it has the form of a singular belief. It is not a
singular propositions, since ‘‘that’’ has no referent. So the content cannot be a
singular proposition since Hallie fails to refer.2
In response to McGrath, if ‘‘singular belief’’ means belief with singular content,
McGrath is wrong that (on my view) Hallie has a singular belief. If, however,
‘‘singular belief’’ means whatever belief is expressed by the relevant demonstrative
utterances, then mcgrath is wrong that (on my view) Hallie’s singular belief isn’t
justified. In short, Hallie’s belief ‘‘that cup is white’’ is justified by her phenomenal
2 Jeshion (2010), Sainsbury (2010) and Crane (2011) have recently argued in different ways against the
view that singular thought is object dependent. They argue that what makes a thought singular is its form
rather than its content. When I argue that a gappy content is singular in form though not in content this
would qualify as a singular thought on such a view. Thanks to James Genone and David Chalmers for
helpful discussions on this issue.
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evidence, contrary to what McGrath says. While I argue that Hallie’s belief ‘‘that
cup is white’’ does not have singular content, it is certainly true that it seems to
Hallie that a particular is present. That is precisely what the notion of
phenomenological particularity captures. It does not, however, follow from the
fact that it seems to her that a particular is present that her general belief depends for
its justification on her singular belief that there is a white cup present being justified.
To argue that it does would be to conflate how things seem to one (an entirely
subjective matter) with what has justificatory force (a matter beyond the subjective).
Contra McGrath, I argue that Hallie has some justification for her belief ‘‘that cup is
white’’. It seeming to her that there is a cup present provides some justification for
her belief ‘‘that is a white cup’’. It provides phenomenal evidence. Hallie does not
possess evidence for that part of her belief that purports to pertain to a particular.
This is a good outcome since—unbeknownst to Hallie—her belief does not in fact
pertain to a particular. It only purports to do so.
Now McGrath argues: ‘‘If we rely on the standard proper-basing requirement on
doxastic justification, then we must conclude that Hallie’s general belief is justified
only if and because her singular belief is. If Schellenberg has to declare the singular
belief unjustified, she seems forced to declare Hallie’s general belief unjustified as
well.’’ As I understand this, McGrath is thinking that Hallie forms the general belief
‘‘there is a white cup here’’ on the basis of the singular belief ‘‘that is a white cup’’,
so that the general belief must inherit justification from the singular belief. In
response, as I argued above, I do not consider Hallie’s belief ‘‘that cup is white’’ to
be a singular belief, however, I do consider it to be justified in virtue of Hallie
having phenomenal evidence. So I do argue that Hallie has a justified general belief
that there is a white cup here. I can allow that the gappy token content that
characterizes Hallie’s hallucinatory state can support the general belief in virtue of
its type.
2.3 Encountering the unknown
McGrath distills the following principle from my discussion of identical twin cases:
If the object a enters into the token content of one’s experience, then one is
prima facie justified in believing that a is present (McGrath 2015).
He then worries that this is ‘‘overly strong’’ on the basis of the following case:
Suppose I happen to see a man on the street. He happens to be Bob Edwards,
the former NPR host. Am I prima facie justified in believing it is Bob
Edwards? No, and not because I have a special defeater. I have no idea what
Bob Edwards looks like. Looking at him, there is no prima facie support from
my experience for Bob Edward is present that is overridden or defeated
(McGrath 2015).
McGrath has my principle right, and I agree with his judgment on the Bob Edwards
case. But I disagree that my principle has any consequences for the Bob Edwards
case. Being Bob Edwards need not be a perceivable property and so need not enter
into the token content of one’s experience (which is what my principles concerns).
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So although we see a person who happens to be Bob Edwards the fact that it is Bob
Edwards need not enter into the content of the experience. I am not saying that such
facts never enter the content of experience. I am saying only that they need not. That
said, I am inclined to think that such facts never enter the content of experience. But
for present purposes I need only the weaker claim that such facts need not always
enter the content of experience, and would not specifically enter the content of
experience of the person (as in McGrath’s example) who has ‘‘no idea what Bob
Edwards looks like.’’ While we say that we see Bob Edwards, we should not put too
much weight on this way of talking. We see his facial features, his posture, and we
see how he walks. Seeing all these things allows us to recognize the person to be
Bob Edwards, should we know what Bob Edwards looks like. But him being Bob
Edwards need not enter into the content of experience. More generally, recogni-
tional concepts need not enter into the content of perception, although they enter
into the beliefs formed on the basis of perception.3
McGrath also offers an extension case with a musical note:
Someone without perfect pitch may hear what is in fact a middle C. The
property of being a C pitch enters the token content of the person’s experience.
Still, the person has no prima facie justification to believe a C pitch is present.
The person doesn’t know a C from a D from an A. There is no prima facie
evidence that is somehow defeated or overridden (McGrath 2015).
In response, I do not see a reason to think that our conventional names for pitches
enter the content of perception. What enters the content of perception is the
particular note played with its timbre, resonance, tonality, and ring. The fact that
humans have agreed to call the note a C need not have any repercussion for the
content of experience. As in the case above, I am not denying that the fact that the
note is a C could be part of what is heard, I am simply denying that it needs to be
part of what is heard. The person McGrath describes, has prima facie justification
that that pitch is present, where ‘‘that’’ singles out the pitch heard. She merely fails
to recognize that pitch as a C.
3 Reply to Pautz
Pautz begins his subtle and closely argued essay by challenging the thesis that a
perceiver is more justified in believing certain things than someone who suffers a
subjectively indistinguishable hallucination. He critically considers three possible
lines of reasoning that I might use to support the thesis that a perceiver has more
justification than a hallucinator. Thereby, he puts the ball back in my court to either
defend one (or more) of these lines of reasoning, or offer another. He also invites me
to consider problem cases involving seamless transitions between perceptions and
hallucinations and graded perceptual justification. I will address these in turn.
3 I am not saying that recognitional concepts never enter into the content of perception. For present
purposes, I remain neutral on that matter. I am, however, arguing that they need not enter into the content
of perception.
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3.1 Why believe that Hallie is more justified than Percy?
Consider again Percy and Hallie. Percy is perceiving a white cup, while Hallie is
unbeknownst to her hallucinating a white cup. Both form the belief ‘‘that is a white
cup’’. As I argue, Percy has more evidence than Hallie, since Percy has factive
evidence and phenomenal evidence for his belief, while Hallie has only phenomenal
evidence. I argue, moreover, that in virtue of having more evidence, Percy’s belief
is better justified than Hallie’s belief: He is more justified in his belief ‘‘that is a
white cup’’ since he has factive evidence in addition to phenomenal evidence. We
can call the thesis that Percy has more evidence than Hallie Extra Evidence and the
thesis that Percy’s belief is better justified than Hallie’s More Justification.
Pautz accepts for the sake of argument that Percy has more evidence than Hallie,
but asks for more explanation as to why we should accept that Percy’s belief is
better justified than Hallie’s in virtue of having more evidence. So he questions
More Justification even assuming Extra Evidence. He offers three routes I might
take to support the move from Extra Evidence to More Justification: (1) by invoking
the stronger linkage principle, that is, the principle that the linkage to the
environment is stronger when one perceives than when one hallucinates, (2) by
invoking the principle that more evidence yields more justification, and (3) by
invoking standard Bayesianism.
I will address Pautz’s three options in turn, but before I do so it is important to
note that these three options are not incompatible. Indeed, they complement one
another. I argue for the stronger linkage principle and accept the standard principle
that more evidence yields more justification. I will say a bit more about both shortly.
While I do not, in the paper at hand, develop an account of how evidence and
justification interact with confidence and do not elaborate on how the capacity view
would cohere with standard Bayesian principles, the reason for this is simply that
one cannot do everything in a short paper. As I will explain, there is—contra
Pautz—nothing in my view that would be at odds with accepting standard Bayesian
principles.
First, let me address Pautz’s question about the stronger linkage principle. Pautz
quotes the following passage from me in relation to this idea:
[Factive evidence] is evidence of a different kind insofar as the systematic
linkage to the environment is stronger than the one governing phenomenal
evidence. More specifically, it is evidence of a different kind because it is
provided by successfully employing perceptual capacities in a particular
environment. So factive evidence provides a rationality boost beyond the one
that a perceiver already has from phenomenal evidence (Pautz 2015).
He asks what ‘stronger’ amounts to with respect to linkage. In response, the sense in
which the linkage to the environment is stronger in the case of perception than in the
case of hallucination is that the conditions that make experience evidentially
forceful are optimal in the case of perception. After all, in perception we are
perceptually related to our environment while in hallucination we fail to be so
related. I understand perception as the product of employing perceptual capacities,
such as capacities to discriminate and single out particulars in one’s environment. I
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argue that a perceiver’s mental states in perception and our mental states in total
hallucination are linked to the environment via the perceptual capacities employed.
This is what gives them their evidential force. When one hallucinates, one’s mental
state is linked to the environment insofar as the perceptual capacities employed are
determined by relations to particulars. While these relations to particulars fail to
actually hold in the case of hallucination, the perceptual capacities employed are
nonetheless determined by the relations that would hold were one in the good case.
When one perceives, one’s mental state is linked to the environment not just
because of the perceptual capacities employed, but since one is in fact perceptually
related to one’s environment. It lies in the very nature of perceptual capacities to
successfully discriminate and single out particulars when conditions are right. In the
good case, our perceptual capacities single out the very particulars they purport to
single out: The linkage between the perceptual state is as strong as it can get. In non-
ideal cases, such as illusion or hallucination, we purport yet fail to single out
particulars. As I argue in the paper, it is because perceptual discriminatory
capacities are by their nature linked to the good case that they manage to provide
evidence and become rational to heed. So what I am saying in the passage Pautz
quotes is that factive evidence is specially tied into the very success conditions that
make perception evidentially forceful in the first place.
Second, let me address Pautz’s question about the principle that more evidence
yields more justification (as discussed in Fantl and McGrath 2002, 2009). Since
what is specifically at issue is whether adding factive evidence on top of
phenomenal evidence should yield a justificatory boost, it will be most useful to
speak to this specific case. The preceding discussion of strong linkage provides my
explanation. The justificatory boost of factive evidence is due to (1) the idea that the
justification of a belief is rooted in the degree to which it is supported by the
evidence, (2) the idea that perceptual discriminatory capacities provide evidence
because they are by nature linked to the good case, and (3) the idea that factive
evidence has a special (maximally) strong linkage to the good case. In other words,
adding factive evidence on top of phenomenal evidence strengthens the linkage to
the success conditions which make perception justificatory in the first place.
Now Pautz thinks my version of Extra Evidence does not support More
Justification given standard Bayesian principles. What leads Pautz to say this is that
he reads what evidence one has off of how one would articulate that evidence. As he
puts it:
In sum, Schellenberg’s view of the two types of evidence, together with their
ordinary-language characterizations, may be put as follows:
Common Phenomenal Evidence: that cup is white.
Percy’s Extra Factive Evidence: that cup is white (Pautz 2015).
In response, while it is true that Hallie would articulate her evidence with ‘‘that cup
is white’’, this does not mean her evidence is ‘‘that cup is white’’. The evidence one
has and how one would articulate that evidence are two very different things. There
is no reason to think that verbal expression of an experience is a good guide to the
content of the experience and thus the evidence one has. Moreover, if the verbal
expression of an experience would be an expression of one’s evidence that would
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rule out any externalist account of evidence. Pautz’s way of putting things in the
passage above is problematic since equating the evidence one has with how one
would articulate that evidence would not only over-intellectualize the content of
experience, it would eradicate any differences in evidence that are not accessed by
the experiencing subject. In short, ‘‘that cup is white’’ is not the evidence one has
when one suffers a hallucination as of a white cup, it is merely the way one might
articulate one’s evidence. Further along in his paper, Pautz writes:
As for Hallie, Schellenberg’s view is that Hallie’s total evidence includes
‘‘phenomenal evidence’’ which, she says, can be articulated by saying ‘‘that
cup is white’’. So it is very natural to suppose that, on Schellenberg’s view,
Hallie’s phenomenal evidence also simply entails Cup, even if that evidence
happens to be false (Pautz 2015).
Cup according to Pautz is the proposition ‘‘there really is a white cup present’’
(Pautz 2015). By conflating the evidence one has with how one would articulate that
evidence, Pautz is lead to claim that on my view
both Hallie and Percy are in possession of evidence that entails Cup. In that
case, given standard Bayesianism, Schellenberg’s own version of Extra
Evidence fails to support her assertion of More Justification, that is, her
assertion that Percy’s evidence supports the belief in Cup ‘to a higher degree’
than does Hallie’s evidence (Pautz 2015).
He goes on to say that both Percy and Hallie’s evidence has probability 1
conditional on their total evidence.
In response, Hallie does not have evidence that entails Cup, and so there is no
Bayesian argument that Hallie has maximal evidence for Cup. Her evidence is
determined by a content schema. Indeed, as I argued above, Hallie does not have the
evidence ‘‘that cup is white’’, even though she may articulate her evidence in that
way when expressing a belief based on her experience. More generally, although
one would articulate the evidence in exactly the same way, the evidence in
subjectively indistinguishable good and bad cases is different. Given that the
experiences are subjectively indistinguishable, it better be the case that one would
articulate them in exactly the same way. Percy does not appreciate his evidence as
being factive. Hallie does not appreciate her evidence as being merely phenomenal.
Of course, Hallie may falsely believe that there really is a cup there due to it
seeming to her that there is a cup there. Hallie may falsely believe all sorts of things.
Hallie falsely believing that there really is a cup there does not imply that she has
evidence that there really is a cup there.
On the capacity view, Percy is in possession of factive evidence that entails Cup
and so—at least assuming standard Bayesian principles—Cup has probability 1 on
his evidence. But Hallie does not have the factive evidence that Hallie possess, and
so Cup does not have probability 1 on her evidence. This is all we need to support
More Justification. So contra Pautz, Hallie and Percy have different evidence. Only
Percy has evidence that entails Cup, and so only Percy’s evidence is such that Cup
has probability 1 on it. So Percy’s evidence (call it Ep) entails Cup, whereas
Hallie’s evidence (Eh) does not entail Cup. So, we can have both of the following:
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1. Pr(Cup | Ep) = 1.
2. Pr(Cup | Eh)\ 1.
Now Bayesians model learning via conditionalization, and post-conditionalization,
propositions learned must receive probability 1. Standard Bayesianism does not
commit one to the idea that the evidence one has is represented by the propositions
one conditionalizes. It is important to separate the question of how to properly
model ‘‘learning’’ from how to individuate a subject’s evidence. Bayesians need not
identify the evidence a subject has with the propositions to which they assign
maximal credence (or to those on which they have conditionalized or
‘‘learned’’). Indeed, Bayesians are free to count uncertain claims as part of an
agent’s evidence.4 So Bayesians are free to say that the experiencing subject is less
than certain in the proposition p which encodes the content of her hallucination—so
long as she has not conditionalized on it, that is, so long as she has not updated on
p via conditionalization). So my version of Extra Evidence supports More
Justification and, moreover, nothing in my view precludes me from appealing to
standard Bayesianism to support More Justification. Once one departs from standard
Bayesianism and allows alternatives to strict conditionalization to model the
learning process (e.g., Jeffrey conditionalization), then it is no longer required that
all ‘‘learned’’ propositions have probability 1. This is an attractive alternative that I
am sympathetic to. However, as I hope to have shown above, the capacity view is
compatible even with Standard Bayesianism.5
3.2 Seamless Transitions
Pautz goes on to raise two problem cases for my view, the first of which is seamless
transition:
Seamless Transition Case. Hallie starts out having a perfect hallucination of
a white cup on a table, although she has no idea that she is hallucinating. Then
her hallucination ceases, but at the same time a white cup is placed on a table
before her. The result is that she transitions between hallucination and
veridical perception. Yet there is no phenomenal change in her experience. In
fact, there is also no other change in her phenomenal life at all. Even so,
suppose that, at the transition point, Hallie becomes more confident in Cup,
the proposition that there is a white cup there (Pautz 2015).
Pautz (rightly) says that my view is that at the transition point, Hallie’s belief in the
proposition that there is a white cup there (Cup) becomes justified to a higher degree
than before. That is after all a consequence of More Justification. But Pautz then
says, ‘‘we find this verdict to be radically mistaken.’’ He adds that Hallie’s increase
in confidence seems ‘‘totally capricious and irrational.’’
As I see it, Pautz has conflated two points. I agree with him that Hallie’s increase
in confidence seems totally capricious and irrational. But that is because her
4 See, Joyce (2005) for a helpful discussion on these issues.
5 Thanks to Branden Fitelson for a helpful email exchange on these issues.
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increase in confidence is not motivated on the basis of engagement with reasons.
The case itself is underdescribed insofar as we are not told why Hallie shifts her
confidence at that crucial moment; it sounds as if she has randomly shuffled her
credences. That would indeed be a capricious and irrational doxastic basis on which
to form any credence whatsoever, irrespective of what the propositional evidence in
fact supports.
Pautz’s intuition is that Hallie has the same evidence from beginning to end even
though she is first hallucinating and at the end perceiving. By my lights, the main
reason to reject Pautz’s intuition that Hallie has the same evidence from beginning
to end is that in the perceptual phase, Hallie has factive evidence in addition to
phenomenal evidence. Hallie’s perceptual discriminatory capacities are now placed
in the very case that by nature they get right. But never mind my specific reasons for
disagreeing with Pautz on this point. Anyone who supports either Extra Evidence or
More Justification, and moreover anyone who has the externalist intuition that the
perceiver is evidentially in a better epistemic situation than the hallucinator, should
disagree with Pautz here. Pautz’s intuition is a distinctively internalist intuition
which many will be motivated to reject. Once one sees that we can accept Pautz’s
point that Hallie’s increase in confidence is totally capricious and irrational, while
still accepting my view (or some other externalist view), then Pautz owes us some
further reason to accept the internalist stance he proposes.
3.3 Graded Justification
The second problem case that Pautz raises for my view is that of graded
justification:
The Complex Percy Case. Percy is having an ordinary veridical experience
of two uniformly colored tomatoes and two uniformly colored bananas on a
table in ideal light. It is obvious to him that each of the tomatoes is a shade of
red and that each of the bananas is a shade of yellow. So he has a great deal of
justification for believing these simple color propositions. What is less obvious
to him is whether the shades of red of the two tomatoes are different. It kind of
seems to him that they are, and if forced to choose he would go for the
‘‘different’’ option, but he cannot be so confident. (If it is a case of a difference
in color, it is what practitioners of psychophysics call a just noticeable
difference in color.) Likewise, it kind of seems to him that the distance
between the tomatoes is slightly greater than the distance between the
bananas. While he isn’t justified in outright believing this, his experience
justifies him in having some level of ‘‘credence’’ in it (Pautz 2015).
Pautz asks, what it is about the experience or circumstances that explains the
different degrees of justification for these different propositions? As Pautz notes, I
want to argue that justification is graded. I agree with Pautz that it is a virtue of the
capacity view that it provides a way of accounting for graded justification and that
many proposals currently on the table do not have room to account for graded
justification. I do not, however, want to accept any of the proposals that Pautz
suggests on my behalf. But this is not Pautz’s fault: I say very little in the paper as to
Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence defended: replies… 941
123
what accounts for the gradedness of justification. For the sake of simplicity, I
discuss only perfectly good cases of perceptions, illusions, and radical hallucina-
tions, that is, hallucinations which are subjectively indistinguishable from percep-
tions but in which one does not in fact see what one seems to be seeing. Naturally,
there are many intermediate and hybrid cases. One can get one property-instance
wrong or many. One can get one object wrong or many. One can confuse one aspect
of an event or many. The more one gets wrong, the worse one’s epistemic situation.
The way I account for this is in terms of more or less gappy propositions. So I
want to argue that justification is graded in virtue of the gappiness of propositions.
This can be interpreted as a matter of strength of linkage. The more gappy the
proposition the weaker the immediate linkage with the environment of the
experiencing subject.
4 Reply to Neta
My thanks to Ram Neta for so clearly situating my project as aiming to reconcile
internalist and externalist intuitions, and for raising a number of challenging
questions.
4.1 Perceptual content
Neta asks why we should think that perception is representational, something I
assume in the paper at hand. In response, this is a great question, and—as Neta
notes—Travis (2004) has raised important challenges to representationalist views
(see also Martin 2004). I have given a full length reply to these challenges elsewhere
(Schellenberg 2011, see also Schellenberg 2014b), but will content myself here with
a brief synopsis of my argument for perception being representational:
P1: If a subject is perceptually related to her environment (while not
suffering from blindsight or any other form of unconscious
perception), then she is sensorily aware of her environment
P2: If a subject is sensorily aware of her environment, then her
environment sensorily seems a certain way to her
P3: If her environment sensorily seems a certain way to her, then she
has an experience with content C, where C corresponds to the way
her environment sensorily seems to her
Conclusion 1: If a subject is perceptually related to her environment (while not
suffering from blindsight or any other form of unconscious
perception), then she has an experience with content C, where
C corresponds to the way her environment sensorily seems to her
P4: Her environment is either the way it sensorily seems to her or it is
different from the way it sensorily seems to her
P5: If a subject has an experience with content C, then C is either
accurate (if her environment is the way it sensorily seems to her)
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or inaccurate (if her environment is not the way it sensorily seems
to her)
Conclusion 2: If a subject is perceptually related to her environment (while not
suffering from blindsight or any other form of unconscious
perception), then the content of her experience is either accurate or
inaccurate (Schellenberg 2014b: 207)
The core idea is that perceptual capacities can be employed such that they single out
particulars or fail to single out particulars. Employing such perceptual capacities
explains the sensory character of experience. The the accuracy conditions on the
employment of perceptual capacities suffice to imbue them with a minimal sort of
representational content, since they are thereby the sorts of things that can be
accurate about the world or not.
4.2 Perceptual capacities and evidence
Neta’s second question is what the connection is between viewing perceptual
capacities as functioning to single out particulars in the environment, and viewing
them as providing evidence for what they are of in the good case. In response, it is
because perceptual capacities function to single out particulars in the environment
that they provide evidence for what they are of in the good case. Why think this? My
argument is that sensory states provide phenomenal evidence since the perceptual
capacities employed in perceptual experience are systematically linked to their
employment in the good case insofar as perceptual capacities are determined by
relations between perceivers and their environment. After all, the function of the
capacity is to differentiate and single out, say, instances of red in perception. In this
sense, there is a metaphysical priority of the good over the bad case in
characterizing the nature of perceptual capacities. In virtue of this metaphysical
priority of the good over the bad case phenomenal states provide us with evidence.
Now, Neta raises the issue that ‘‘the primal sketch’’ in Marr’s theory of vision
also seems to function to single out particulars in the environment, but does not
itself yield any evidence for the subject. What is the relevant difference (if any)? In
response, the primal sketch in Marr’s theory of vision is subpersonal and
accordingly does not itself yield evidence for the subject. But perceptual
discriminatory capacities, producing subject-level perceptual content, are capable
themselves of providing evidence for the subject—or so I argue. To be sure, I have
not given an argument in support of the thesis that the primal sketch does not
provide evidence of some sort. It may well be understood as providing evidence to
the perceptual system at a subpersonal level. If that were the case that would not be
a problem for my view. The crucial point is that to provide evidence at a
subpersonal level is not to provide evidence for the experiencing subject.
4.3 Gappy content and evidence
A further question that Neta raises is if and how I can reconcile the ideas that (1) the
content of hallucination is gappy, (2) hallucinators have evidence, and (3) evidence
is constituted (among other things) by a proposition? In response, I accept all three
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claims and will explain how they are consistent. I understand perceptual experience
as characterized by two levels of content: a content token and content type. In the
case of a hallucination, the content token is gappy. The content type is a content
schema, that is, it is a potentially particularized content. This content schema is a
derived notion of content that subjectively indistinguishable perceptions, halluci-
nations, and illusions have in common. Hallucinators have phenomenal evidence in
virtue of their mental state being characterized by these two levels of content. No
doubt a gappy proposition is a strange proposition, but it is a proposition
nonetheless. As I argue elsewhere, a gappy proposition is best thought of as
necessarily false (Schellenberg 2010, 2013b). After all, if a content is gappy then it
infallibly fails to be accurate of the world. If the gappy content is necessarily false,
then it has a truth value. The derived notion of content—the content type—can by
contrast either be accurate or inaccurate of the world.
What does this entail for the justificatory role of hallucinations? Consider the
gappy content\MOPo(__), MOPF(__)[, where MOPo(__) in the object-place is a
gappy, object-related de remode of presentation and MOPF(__) in the property place
is gappy, property-related de remode of presentation that would single out an instance
of the property F, where one perceptually related to such an instance. It seems to the
hallucinator whose mental state is characterized by such a content that ‘‘There is an x
Fx’’. An important point in this context is that the gappy content\MOPo(__),
MOPF(__)[ justifies ‘‘There is an x Fx’’ but it does not entail ‘‘There is an x Fx’’.
What logically follows from the gappy content\MOPo(__), MOPF(__)[and what
the subject is justified in believing on the basis of\MOPo(__), MOPF(__)[ come
apart. We are justified in believing what logically follows, but we are also justified in
some other things, for example things that seem to logically follow. Since I argue that
the content of hallucination is gappy and therefore necessarily false, and since I argue
moreover that the content of hallucination provides phenomenal evidence, I am
arguing that not all evidence is known (and indeed that not all evidence is true). In this
way my view diverges, for instance, from that of Williamson, who equates the
subject’s evidence with what she knows. But in this way, I am able to reconcile the
three points with which Neta is concerned.
4.4 The epistemic difference between Percy and Hallie
Neta raises a series of questions that center on how we should think about the
epistemic difference between Percy and Hallie. I have addressed some of these
questions in my responses to McGrath and Pautz above and so will focus on those
elements that go beyond the questions that McGrath and Pautz raise. Neta asks what
the status is of the claim that Hallie and Percy have evidence in common. In
particular, he asks whether this claim is treated as a datum or as a feature of my
view that recommends it in some way. In response, this strikes me as a false
dilemma. Datum is a strong notion. The notion that Hallie and Percy have evidence
in common is a plausible first pass assumption that could possibly be overridden. So
in that sense, it is not a datum, but rather something that should be explained. I hope
to have given an explanation for why Hallie and Percy have evidence in common
(see in particular Schellenberg 2013a).
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4.5 Evidence and the rationality of Credal States
Neta asks how evidence bears on the rationality of mental states other than beliefs,
such as credences. He imagines a case in which one is first perceiving a white cup
(cup1) and then starts hallucinating a cup. Neta asks ‘‘what implications does this
new hallucination have for the rationality of Percy’s states of comparative
confidence, or for her rationality of her degrees of confidence?’’ In response, I
would say that the subject in this case has phenomenal and factive evidence for the
presence of cup1 and phenomenal evidence for the cup he is hallucinating. In
contrast to Neta, I see no reason for thinking that his evidence for the presence of
cup1 changes after he has started to hallucinate an additional cup—while still
perceiving cup1. After all, he does not know he is hallucinating an additional cup.
So he has no reason to doubt his over all epistemic standing. Moreover, there are
good reasons to treat separately the fact that he is veridically perceiving cup1 while
hallucinating an additional cup. We do not have to treat these two aspects of his
current mental state as interfering with one another.
Following on my response to Pautz above, I would say that his rational
confidence in cup1 being present is 1 (before and after he starts hallucinating the
second cup), but that his rational confidence in an additional cup being present is
lower. After all, he is hallucinating rather than perceiving that additional cup.
Parallel to what I said about evidence above, I see no reason to think that
hallucinating an additional cup should lower his rational confidence in the presence
of cup1. This approach goes hand in hand with arguing that the rationality of his
degree of confidence will change as his environment changes. In that sense, I am
following the standard externalist approach about rationality in holding that the
amount of rational confidence one has can change due to external factors.6
Neta ends his comments by asking how my view compares to other alternative
views in the literature, such as the views of Sosa as well as Plantiga, Williamson,
and Burge. In response, I have, in this paper, not tried to refute alternative views, but
have focused rather on developing my positive proposal. To compare my view to
these other views would require at minimum four separate papers. I have elsewhere
discussed the difference between my view and Sosa’s, Burge’s, and Williamson’s
(see Schellenberg 2013a, 2014a).7 But, if only to take up an invitation to say
something that might be of interest, I think I can say something fairly brief by way
of at least comparing my approach with that of Sosa. Sosa develops his notion of
competences (or capacities) in reliabilist terms. In doing so, his view is subject to all
the well-known problems that reliabilism faces.8 Insofar as the capacity view that I
have put forward is distinctly non-normative and non-reliabilist it avoids these
6 For an argument that we have no good grip on what counts as evidence for p that does not enter into
determining one’s rational level of confidence that p, see Neta (2008).
7 See also the comparison of Williamson and my views in Pautz’s contribution to this volume.
8 For example, Lehrer’s (1990) Truetemp counterexample: Mr. Truetemp has, unbeknownst to him, a
temperature-detecting device implanted in his head that regularly produces accurate beliefs about the
ambient temperature.
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problems. My capacity view is compatible with a broadly virtue-based epistemol-
ogy, and by adopting it Sosa could resolve this trouble.
As I argue, it is in virtue of the primacy of the good over the bad case that the
mental states yielded by employing capacities have epistemic force. So there is no
sense in which the epistemic force of mental states yielded by employing capacities
is understood in terms of the reliability of the capacities employed. Of course, it
might be that the capacities are reliable, but even if that is so, that is not what
imbues the mental state with its epistemic force. So neither the capacities nor the
metaphysical and explanatory primacy notions in play need be understood in terms
reliability or any normative ways. Indeed, the capacity view shows how the
epistemic force of experience is grounded in metaphysical facts about experience.
Moreover, while Sosa does not appeal to phenomenal and factive evidence, nothing
in his view should preclude him for accepting the two levels of evidence that I
propose.
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